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In simple one-good international macro models, the presence of non-diversifiable labor income risk
means that country portfoliosshould be heavily biased toward foreign assets. The fact that theopposite
pattern of diversification is observed empirically constitutes the international diversification puzzle.
We embed aportfolio choice decision in a frictionless two-country, two-good version of the stochastic
growth model. In this environment, which is a workhorse for international business cycle research,
we derive a closed-form expression for equilibrium country portfolios. These are biased towards domestic
assets, as in the data. Home bias arises because endogenous international relative price fluctuations
make domestic stocks a good hedge against non-diversifiable labor income risk. We then use our our
theory to link openness to trade to the level of diversification, and find that it offers a quantitatively















Although there has been rapid growth in international portfolio diversiﬁcation in recent years,
portfolios remain heavily biased towards domestic assets. For example, foreign assets accounted,
on average, for only around 25% of the total value of the assets owned by U.S. residents over
the period 1990-2004. There is a large theoretical literature that explores whether observed low
diversiﬁcation should be interpreted as evidence of incomplete insurance against country-speciﬁc
risk (see, for example, Baxter and Jermann, 1997, and Lewis, 1999). These papers share a common
conclusion: relative to the prediction of frictionless models, too little diversiﬁcation is observed
in the data. In response, recent theoretical work on diversiﬁcation has focused on introducing
frictions that can rationalize observed portfolios. The set of candidate frictions is long and includes
proportional or ﬁxed costs on foreign equity holdings (Lewis, 1996; Amadi and Bergin, 2006;
Coeurdacier and Guibaud, 2006), costs in goods trade (Uppal, 1993; Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2000;
Coeurdacier, 2006), liquidity or short sales constraints (Michaelides, 2003; Julliard, 2004), price
stickiness in product markets (Engel and Matsumoto, 2006), weak investor rights concentrating
ownership among insiders (Kho et. al., 2006), non-tradability of nontraded-good equities (Tesar,
1993; Pesenti and van Wincoop, 2002; Hnatkovska, 2005) and asymmetric information in ﬁnancial
markets (Gehrig, 1993; Jeske, 2001; Hatchondo, 2005; and van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2007).
In this paper, we take a diﬀerent approach. We develop a frictionless model in which perfect risk
sharing is in fact wholly consistent with relatively low levels of international diversiﬁcation. We
argue that previous theoretical benchmarks delivered the wrong answers because the models were
too simple to capture the key diversiﬁcation motives associated with country-speciﬁc business cycle
risks. Our environment is the two-country extension of the stochastic growth model developed by
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992 and 1995, henceforth BKK), which is a workhorse model for
quantitative international macroeconomics. While BKK allow for a complete set of Arrow securities
to be traded between countries, we instead follow the tradition in the international diversiﬁcation
literature and assume that households only trade shares in domestic and foreign ﬁrms. BKK and
others have shown that the international stochastic growth model is broadly consistent with a
large set of international business cycle facts. We show that the same model rationalizes observed
levels of international diversiﬁcation. Since our model is frictionless, this ﬁnding casts doubt on
the quantitative role of frictions in understanding observed portfolios.
One contribution of our paper is to show that given particular assumptions on preferences and
1technologies, equilibrium portfolio choices can be characterized analytically.2 In this case, the equi-
librium portfolio choice depends on only two parameters: (i) the relative preference in consumption
for domestically-produced versus imported goods, and (ii) capital’s share in production. When
these parameters are set to the values used by BKK, our expression implies portfolios comprising
80% domestic stocks and 20% foreign stocks. Moreover, this portfolio perfectly insures consumers
against country-speciﬁc productivity shocks. We conclude that observed low levels of diversiﬁcation
should not be interpreted as indicating a low degree of international risk sharing.
To better understand the predictions of our model for portfolio choice we compare and contrast
our economy to those considered by Lucas (1982), Baxter and Jermann (1997), and Cole and
Obstfeld (1991). Lucas (1982) points out that in a symmetric one-good two-country model, perfect
risk pooling involves agents of each country owning half the claims to the home endowment and
half the claims to the foreign endowment. Baxter and Jermann (1997) extend Lucas’ model in one
direction by introducing production while retaining the single-good assumption. They show that if
returns to capital and labor are highly correlated within a country, then agents can compensate for
non-diversiﬁable labor income risk by aggressively diversifying asset holdings. In their examples,
fully diversiﬁed portfolios typically involve substantial short positions in domestic assets.
Cole and Obstfeld (1991) extend Lucas’ analysis in a diﬀerent direction. They retain the focus
on an endowment economy, but assume that the two countries receive endowments of diﬀerent
goods that are imperfect substitutes. These goods are then traded, and agents consume bundles
comprising both goods. They show that changes in relative endowments induce oﬀ-setting changes
in the terms of trade. When preferences are log-separable between the two goods, the terms of
trade responds one-for-one to changes in relative income, eﬀectively delivering perfect risk-sharing.
Thus, in sharp contrast to the results of Lucas or Baxter and Jermann, any level of diversiﬁcation
is consistent with complete risk-pooling, including portfolio autarky.3
One important diﬀerence in our analysis relative to Baxter and Jermann (1997) is that we allow
for imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign-produced traded goods, following Cole
and Obstfeld (1991). Thus, in our model, changes in international relative prices provide some
insurance against country-speciﬁc shocks and, in the ﬂavor of the Cole and Obstfeld indetermi-
2The assumptions required to derive an analytical expression for the portfolio choice are (i) preferences are sep-
arable between consumption and leisure and logarithmic in consumption, and (ii) all production technologies are
Cobb-Douglas, which implies a unitary elasticity of substitution between traded goods.
3Kollmann (2006) considers a two-good endowment economy with more general preferences. He ﬁnds that equi-
librium diversiﬁcation is sensitive to both the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between traded goods, and the
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution for the aggregate consumption bundle.
2nacy result, portfolio choice does not have to do all the heavy-lifting when it comes to delivering
perfect risk-sharing. In contrast to Cole and Obstfeld, however, the presence of production and
particularly investment in our model means that returns to domestic and foreign stocks are not au-
tomatically equated, and thus agents face an interesting portfolio choice problem. Home bias arises
because relative returns to domestic stocks move inversely with relative labor income in response
to productivity shocks. This pattern is due jointly to international relative price movements and
to the presence of investment and capital, and it accounts for the diﬀerence between the portfolio
predictions of our model relative to those of one-good models explored in previous work.
We conduct a sensitivity analysis in which we consider the implications for diversiﬁcation of
varying two key parameters: the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign-produced
goods, and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution for the composite consumption good. We
show that home bias is a robust prediction of the model for all plausible values for these parameters.
We also extend the model to introduce preference shocks as a second source of risk, and one that
induces very diﬀerent relative price dynamics in response to a shock. Our low equilibrium diver-
siﬁcation result also survives here, while the model with both productivity and preference shocks
delivers a realistically low unconditional equilibrium correlation between relative consumption and
the real exchange rate.
The closed-form expression we derive for equilibrium portfolios makes it straightforward to
assess whether the model is useful for understanding variation in international diversiﬁcation across
countries and across time. In particular, the model suggests that diﬀerences in diversiﬁcation across
space and time should be related in a non linear fashion to changes in trade openness. We ﬁnd that
this theoretical relationship is both qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the empirical
pattern for a large sample of developed economies over the period 1990-2004. We also ﬁnd that
using a simple relation from the model together with trade data can explain around a third of the
cross-country variation in portfolio diversiﬁcation and about 15% of the variation in diversiﬁcation
across time, suggesting that risk sharing considerations are indeed an economically important factor
in understanding the determination and the evolution of country portfolios.
In the next section we describe the model and state our main result. Section 3 oﬀers some
intuition for equilibrium portfolios. Section 4 discusses some extensions of the basic model. Section
5 contains the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes. Proofs, details about numerical methods,
and a description of the data are in the Appendix.
32 The Model
The modeling framework is the one developed by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995). There are two
countries, each of which is populated by the same measure of identical, inﬁnitely-lived households.
Firms in each country use country-speciﬁc capital and labor to produce an intermediate good. The
intermediate good produced in the domestic country is labeled a, while the good produced in the
foreign country is labeled b. These are the only traded goods in the world economy. Intermediate-
goods-producing ﬁrms are subject to country-speciﬁc productivity shocks. Within each country
the intermediate goods a and b are combined to produce country-speciﬁc ﬁnal consumption and
investment goods. The ﬁnal goods production technologies are asymmetric across countries, in that
they are biased towards using a larger fraction of the locally-produced intermediate good. This
bias allows the model to replicate empirical measures for the volume of trade relative to GDP.
We assume that the assets that are traded internationally are shares in the domestic and foreign
representative intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrms. These ﬁrms make investment and employment
decisions, and distribute any non-reinvested earnings to shareholders.
2.1 Preferences and technologies
In each period t the economy experiences one event st ∈ S. We denote by st = (s0,s1,...,st) ∈ St
the history of events from date 0 to date t. The probability at date 0 of any particular history st is
given by π(st).









where c(st) denotes consumption at date t given history st, and n(st) denotes labor supply. Disu-
tility from labor is given by the positive, increasing and convex function V (.). The assumption
that utility is log-separable in consumption will play a role in deriving a closed-form expression
for equilibrium portfolios in our baseline calibration of the model. In contrast, the equilibrium
portfolio in this case will not depend on the particular functional form for V (.).
Households supply labor to domestically located perfectly-competitive intermediate-goods-producing
ﬁrms. Intermediate goods ﬁrms in the domestic country produce good a, while those in the foreign
4The equations describing the foreign country are largely identical to those for the domestic country. We use star
superscripts to denote foreign variables.









where z(st) is an exogenous productivity shock. The vector of shocks [z(st),z∗(st)] evolves stochas-
tically. For now, the only assumption we make about this process is that it is symmetric. In the
baseline version of the model, productivity shocks are the only source of uncertainty.
Each period, households receive dividends from their stock holdings in the domestic and foreign
intermediate-goods ﬁrms, and buy and sell shares to adjust their portfolios. After completing asset
trade, households sell their holdings of intermediate goods to domestically located ﬁnal-goods-
producing ﬁrms. These ﬁrms are perfectly competitive and produce ﬁnal goods using intermediate









where ω > 0.5 determines the size of the local input bias in the composition of domestically
produced ﬁnal goods.
Note that the Cobb-Douglas assumption implies a unitary elasticity of substitution between
domestically-produced goods and imports. The Cobb-Douglas assumption, in conjunction with
the assumption that utility is logarithmic in consumption, will allow us to derive a closed-form
expression for equilibrium portfolios. Note, however, that a unitary elasticity is within the range
of existing estimates: BKK (1995) set this elasticity to 1.5 in their benchmark calibration, while
Heathcote and Perri (2002) estimate the elasticity to be 0.9. In a sensitivity analysis we will explore
numerically the implications of deviating from the logarithmic utility, unitary elasticity baseline.
We now deﬁne two relative prices that will be useful in the subsequent analysis. Let t(st) denote
the terms of trade, deﬁned as the price of good b relative to good a. Because the law of one price









Let e(st) denote the real exchange rate, deﬁned as the price of foreign relative to domestic con-
sumption. By the law of one price, e(st) can be expressed as the foreign price of good a (or good b)





















= qa(st)w(st)n(st) + λH(st−1)d(st) + λF(st−1)e(st)d∗(st) ∀t ≥ 0,st
Here P(st) is the price at st of (ex dividend) shares in the domestic ﬁrm in units of domestic
consumption, P∗(st) is the price of shares in the foreign ﬁrm in units of foreign consumption,
λH(st) (λ∗
H(st)) denotes the fraction of the domestic ﬁrm purchased by the domestic (foreign)
agent, λF(st) (λ∗
F(st)) denotes the fraction of the foreign ﬁrm bought by the domestic (foreign)
agent, d(st) and d∗(st) denote domestic and foreign dividend payments per share, and w(st) denotes
the domestic wage in units of the domestically-produced intermediate good. The budget constraint

















H(st−1)(1/e(st))d(st) ∀t ≥ 0,st
We assume that at the start of period 0, the domestic (foreign) household owns the entire
domestic (foreign) ﬁrm: thus λH(s−1) = 1, λF(s−1) = 0, λ∗
F(s−1) = 1 and λ∗
H(s−1) = 0.
At date 0, domestic households choose λH(st), λF(st), c(st) ≥ 0 and n(st) ∈ [0,1] for all st and










subject to (6) and a no Ponzi game condition.

















where we use Uc(st) for
∂U(c(st),n(st))
∂c(st) and (st,st+1) denotes the t + 1 length history st followed by
st+1
The domestic household’s ﬁrst-order condition for hours is
Uc(st)qa(st)w(st) + Un(st) ≥ 0 (10)
= if n(st) > 0
Analogously, the foreign households’ ﬁrst-order condition for domestic and foreign stock pur-
































n(st) ≥ 0 (12)
= if n∗(st) > 0.
2.3 Intermediate ﬁrms’ problem
The domestic intermediate-goods ﬁrm’s maximization problem is to choose k(st) ≥ 0, n(st) ≥ 0 for






7taking as given k(s−1), where Q(st) is the price the ﬁrm uses to value dividends at st relative to
consumption at date 0, and dividends (in units of the ﬁnal good) are given by










k(st) − (1 − δ)k(st−1)

.
In this expression δ is the depreciation rate for capital. Analogously, foreign ﬁrms use prices
Q∗(st) to price dividends in state st, where foreign dividends are given by











k∗(st) − (1 − δ)k∗(st−1)

.
The domestic and foreign ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions for n(st) and n∗(st) are
































/k∗(st) + (1 − δ)

The state-contingent consumption prices Q(st) and Q∗(st) obviously play a role in intermediate–
goods ﬁrms’ state-contingent decisions regarding how to divide earnings between investment and
dividend payments. We assume that domestic ﬁrms use the discount factor of the representative











5Under the baseline calibration of the model, the solution to the ﬁrm’s problem will turn out to be the same for
any set of state-contingent prices that are weighted averages of the discount factors of the representative domestic
and foreign households. Note that each agent takes Q(s
t) as given, understanding that their individual atomistic
portfolio choices will not aﬀect aggregate investment decisions.
82.4 Final goods ﬁrms’ problem




G(a(st),b(st)) − qa(st)a(st) − qb(st)b(st)
	
subject to a(st), b(st) ≥ 0.
The ﬁrst order conditions for domestic and foreign ﬁrms may be written as
(20)
qa(st) = ωG(a(st),b(st))/a(st), qb(st) = (1 − ω)G(a(st),b(st))/b(st),
q∗








2.5 Deﬁnition of equilibrium
An equilibrium is a set of quantities c(st), c∗(st), k(st), k∗(st), n(st), n∗(st), a(st), a∗(st), b(st),
b∗(st), λH(st), λ∗
H(st), λF(st), λ∗
F(st), prices P(st), P∗(st), r(st), r∗(st), w(st), w∗(st), Q(st), Q∗(st),
qa(st), q∗
a(st), qb(st), q∗
b(st), productivity shocks z(st), z∗(st) and probabilities π(st) for all st and
for all t ≥ 0 which satisfy the following conditions:
1. The ﬁrst order conditions for intermediate-goods purchases by ﬁnal-goods ﬁrms (equation 20)
2. The ﬁrst-order conditions for labor demand by intermediate-goods ﬁrms (equations 15 & 16)
3. The ﬁrst-order conditions for labor supply by households (equations 10 & 12)
4. The ﬁrst-order conditions for capital accumulation (equations 17 & 18),
5. The market clearing conditions for intermediate goods a and b :










6. The market-clearing conditions for ﬁnal goods:









97. The market-clearing condition for stocks:
(23) λH(st) + λ∗
H(st) = 1 λF(st) + λ∗
F(st) = 1.
8. The households’ budget constraints (equations 6 & 7)
9. The households’ ﬁrst-order conditions for stock purchases (equations 9 & 11).





PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that at time zero, productivity is equal to its unconditional mean
value in both countries (z(s0) = z∗(s0) = 0) and that initial capital is equalized across countries,
k(s−1) = k∗(s−1) > 0. Then there is an equilibrium in this economy with the property that
portfolios in both countries exhibit a constant level of diversiﬁcation given by
(24) 1 − λ = λF(st) = λ∗
H(st) = 1 − λH(st) = 1 − λ∗
F(st) =
1 − ω
1 + θ − 2ωθ
∀t,st
Moreover, in this equilibrium stock prices are given by
(25) P(st) = k(st), P∗(st) = k∗(st) ∀t,st.
PROOF: See the appendix
We prove this result by showing that these portfolios decentralize the solution to an equal-
weighted planner’s problem in the same environment. In particular, we consider the problem of a
planner who seeks to maximize the equally-weighted expected utilities of the domestic and foreign
agents, subject only to resource constraints of the form (21) and (22). We then describe a set of
candidate prices such that if the conditions that deﬁne a solution to the planner’s problem are
satisﬁed, then the conditions that deﬁne a competitive equilibrium in the stock trade economy are
also satisﬁed when portfolios are given by equation (24).
3 Intuition for the result
What explains the ﬁnding that two stocks are suﬃcient to eﬀectively complete markets in this
economy, and how should we understand the particular expression for the portfolios that deliver
10perfect risk sharing in equation (24)? We now build intuition for these results from two diﬀerent
perspectives. First, we take a macroeconomic general equilibrium perspective, and combine a set
of equilibrium conditions that link diﬀerences between domestic and foreign aggregate demand and
aggregate supply in this economy. These equations shed light on how changes in relative prices
coupled with modest levels of international portfolio diversiﬁcation allow agents to achieve perfect
risk-sharing. We then take a more micro agent-based perspective, and explore how, from a price-
taking individual’s point of view, returns to labor and to domestic and foreign stocks co-vary in
such a way that agents prefer to bias portfolios towards domestic assets.
3.1 Macroeconomic Intuition
We now develop three key equations that are helpful for understanding the macroeconomics of how
the equilibrium portfolio choices, deﬁned in equation (24), deliver perfect risk-sharing.
The ﬁrst equation is the hallmark condition for complete international risk-sharing, relating
relative marginal utilities from consumption to the international relative price of consumption.
Since the utility function is log-separable in consumption, this condition is simply
(26) c(st) = e(st)c∗(st) ∀st,
which we can write more compactly as ∆c(st) = 0, where ∆c(st) denotes the diﬀerence between
domestic and foreign consumption in units of the domestic ﬁnal good.
The second key equation uses budget constraints to express the diﬀerence between foreign and
domestic consumption as a function of relative investment and relative GDP. Assuming constant
portfolios, where λ denotes the fraction of the domestic (foreign) ﬁrm owned by domestic (foreign)
households, domestic consumption is given by
c(st) = qa(st)w(st)n(st) + λd(st) + (1 − λ)e(st)d∗(st)









where the second line follows from the deﬁnitions for dividends, and the assumption that the
intermediate-goods production technology is Cobb-Douglas in capital and labor. Given a similar
expression for foreign consumption, the diﬀerence between the value of consumption across countries
11is given by
(28) ∆c(st) = (1 − 2(1 − λ)θ)∆y(st) + (1 − 2λ)∆x(st)
Note that in the case of complete home bias (λ = 1), the relative value of consumption across
countries would simply be the diﬀerence between relative output and relative investment. For
λ < 1, ﬁnancial ﬂows mean that some fraction of changes in relative output and investment are
ﬁnanced by foreigners.
Equations (26) and (28) do not depend on the elasticity of substitution between traded goods,
and can therefore be applied unchanged to the one-good models that have been the focus of much
of the previous work on portfolio diversiﬁcation (in a one-good model e(st) = 1). It is useful to
brieﬂy revisit some important results in this existing literature, prior to explaining why the portfolio
predictions from the two-good model that is the focus of this paper diﬀer so sharply.
Lucas considers a one-good endowment economy, which we can reinterpret in the context of (28)
by setting θ = 1 and ∆x(st) = 0 for all st. In this case it is immediate that perfect risk pooling
is achieved when agents hold 50 percent of both domestic and foreign shares in each period, i.e.
λ = 0.5.6
Baxter and Jermann (1997) study a one-good economy with production. They argue that since
the Cobb-Douglas technology implies correlated returns to capital and labor, agents can eﬀectively
diversify non-diversiﬁable country-speciﬁc labor income risk by aggressively diversifying claims to
capital. Assuming ﬁrms in both countries target a constant capital stock, in which case ∆x = 0,
achieving perfect risk-sharing (∆c = 0) in the context of equation (28) means picking a value for λ
such that the coeﬃcient on ∆GDP is zero. The implied value for diversiﬁcation is 1−λ = 1/(2θ),
which is exactly the portfolio described by equation (2) in Baxter and Jermann. If capital’s share θ
is set to a third, the value for λ that delivers equal consumption in the two countries is −0.5. Thus,
as Baxter and Jermann emphasize, a diversiﬁed portfolio involves a negative position in domestic
assets.7
6Cantor and Mark extend Lucas’ analysis to a simple environment with production. However, they make several
assumptions that ensure that their economy inherits the properties of Lucas’. In particular, (i) domestic and foreign
agents have the same log-separable preferences over consumption and leisure, (ii) productivity shocks are assumed to
be iid through time, (iii) ﬁrms must purchase capital and rent labor one period before production takes place, and
(iv) there is 100% depreciation. When their two economies are the same size, assumptions (ii) and (iii) ensure that
in an eﬃcient allocation capital and labor are always equalized across countries. Thus to deliver perfect risk-sharing,
the optimal portfolio choice simply has to ensure an equal division of next period output, which is ensured with
Lucas’ 50-50 portfolio split.
7Note that equation (28) suggests that there will always exist a portfolio that delivers perfect risk sharing as
12Our model enriches the Baxter and Jermann analysis along two dimensions. First, we explicitly
endogenize investment. With stochastic investment, equation (28) indicates that, in general, no
constant value for λ will deliver ∆c(st) = 0, the perfect risk-sharing condition. Thus, in a one-
good model, perfect risk-sharing is not achievable with constant portfolios. However, our second
extension relative to Baxter and Jermann is to assume that the two countries produce diﬀerent
traded goods that are imperfect substitutes when it comes to producing the ﬁnal consumption-
investment good. As we now explain, the Cobb-Douglas technology we assume for combining
these traded goods implies an additional equilibrium linear relationship between ∆y(st), ∆(ct) and
∆x(st) - our third key equation - such that perfect risk-sharing can be resurrected given appropriate
constant portfolios.





= qa(st)a(st) + e(st)q∗
a(st)a∗(st) (29)
= ωG(st) + e(st)(1 − ω)G∗(st)
Similarly, foreign GDP is given by
(30) y∗(st) = (1/e(st))(1 − ω)G(st) + ωG∗(st)
Combining the two expressions above, ∆y(st), the diﬀerence between the value of domestic and
foreign GDP, is linearly related to the diﬀerence between domestic and foreign absorption:









This equation indicates that changes to relative domestic versus foreign demand for consumption
or investment automatically change the relative value of intermediate output. The fact that coun-
tries devote a constant fraction of total ﬁnal expenditure to each of the two intermediate goods
long as ∆x is strictly proportional to ∆GDP. Thus, as an alternative to assuming ∆x = 0, we could assume, for
example, that ﬁrms invest a ﬁxed fraction of output, so that x(s
t) = κGDP(x
t). In this case, in a one-good world,




As an example, if the investment rate κ is equal to 0.2 and capital’s share is 1/3, the value for λ that delivers
consumption equalization is −1.25, implying an even larger short position in domestic assets than the one predicted
by Baxter and Jermann. The intuition is simply that foreign stocks are now a less eﬀective hedge, since following an
increase in foreign output, foreign investment rises, reducing income from foreign dividends.
13means that the size of the eﬀect is proportional to the change in demand, where the constant of
proportionality is (2ω − 1). When the technologies for producing domestic and foreign ﬁnal goods
are the same (ω = 0.5), changes to relative demand do not impact the relative value of the outputs
of goods a and b. When ﬁnal goods are produced only with good a (ω = 1), an increase in domestic
demand translates into an equal-sized increase in the relative price of good a (assuming no supply
response). For intermediate values for ω, the stronger the preference for home-produced goods, the
larger the impact on the relative value of domestic output.
Note that this equation is independent of preferences and the asset market structure, and follows
solely from our Cobb-Douglas assumption, implying a unitary elasticity of substitution between the
two traded goods.
We can now combine our three key equations, (26), (28) and (31) to explore the relationship
between portfolio choice, relative price movements, and international risk-sharing. We start by
substituting (31) into (28) to express the diﬀerence in consumption as a function solely of the
diﬀerence in investment:8
(32) ∆c(st) = (1 − 2(1 − λ)θ)(2ω − 1)(∆c(st) + ∆c(st)) + (1 − 2λ)∆x(st)
which implies that
(33) µ∆c(st) = (1 − 2λ)
| {z }
direct foreign financing




where µ is a constant.
There is a unique value for λ such that the right hand side of (33) is always equal to zero. In
particular, simple algebra conﬁrms that this value is deﬁned in Proposition 1 (equation 24).
As a ﬁrst step towards understanding the implications of equation (33) for portfolio choice, we
ﬁrst revisit a result due to Cole and Obstfeld (1991), who consider a two-country endowment econ-
omy. They show that when domestic and foreign agents share the same log-separable preferences
for consuming the two goods, then a regime of portfolio autarky (100 percent home bias or λ = 1)
delivers the same allocations as a world with a complete set of internationally-traded assets. In the
context of our model, considering an endowment economy eﬀectively implies ∆x = 0, in which case
equations (28) and (31) become two independent equations in two unknowns, ∆c and ∆y. The only
8Alternatively, one could substitute out investment to derive an equation linking ∆y(s
t) to ∆c(s
t).
14possible solution is ∆c = ∆y = 0. Thus for any choice for λ, including the portfolio autarky value
λ = 1 emphasized by Cole and Obstfeld, perfect risk-pooling is achieved. The reason is simply
that diﬀerences in relative quantities of output are automatically oﬀset one-for-one by diﬀerences
in the real exchange rate, so y = ey∗. Thus movements in the terms of trade provide automatic and
perfect insurance against ﬂuctuations in the relative quantities of intermediate goods supplied.9
In contrast to the Cole and Obstfeld result, only one portfolio delivers perfect risk-pooling in
our economy. Furthermore, portfolio autarky is only eﬃcient in the case when there is complete
specialization in tastes, so that ω = 1. The reason for these diﬀerences relative to their results is
that with partial depreciation and persistent productivity shocks, eﬃcient investment will not be
either constant or a constant fraction of output; rather, as in a standard growth model, positive
persistent productivity shocks will be associated with a surge in investment. Thus dividends are
not automatically equated across domestic and foreign stocks, and asset income is sensitive to
portfolio choice. Moreover, these investment responses mediate relative price movements, so that
relative earnings also ﬂuctuate in response to productivity shocks. Nonetheless, the Cole and
Obstfeld result is useful in that it reminds us that absent changes in relative investment, automatic
insurance delivered through changes in the terms of trade would automatically deliver perfect risk-
pooling. Thus one way to think about the role of portfolio diversiﬁcation is to ensure that the cost
of funding changes in investment is eﬃciently split between domestic and foreign residents.
We can use equation (33) to understand the eﬀect of an investment shock ∆x(st) on relative
consumption, ∆c(st). Absent any diversiﬁcation, an increase in ∆x(st) would reduce ∆c(st) pro-
portionately. For λ < 1 some of the cost of additional domestic investment is paid for by foreign
shareholders directly (the ﬁrst term on the right hand side) or indirectly through changes in relative
prices (the second term). The direct foreign ﬁnancing eﬀect depends on the diﬀerence between the
fraction of domestic stock held by foreigners relative to domestic agents ((1−λ)−λ). The indirect
eﬀect works as follows: an increase in relative domestic investment increases the relative value of
domestic output in proportion to the factor (2ω − 1) (see eq. 31). This captures the fact that an
increase in relative demand for domestic ﬁnal goods has a positive eﬀect on the terms of trade for
9Cole and Obstfeld also consider a version of the model with production. In this version the two goods may
be consumed or used as capital inputs to produce in the next period. Like Cantor and Mark (1988) they assume
100 percent capital depreciation. When production technologies are Cobb-Douglas in the quantities of the two
goods allocated for investment, portfolio autarky once again delivers perfect risk-sharing. The reason is that the
assumptions of log separable preferences and full depreciation imply that consumption, investment and dividends
are all ﬁxed fractions of output, so that ∆x = κ∆GDP. Given this relationship, equations 28 and 31 reduce to two
independent equations in two unknowns, ∆c and ∆GDP. Thus total dividend income in any given period is again
independent of the portfolio split.
15the domestic economy. The fraction of this additional output that accrues as income to domestic
shareholders is given by the term (1 − 2(1 − λ)θ), which in turn amounts to labor’s share of income
(1 − θ) plus the diﬀerence between domestic and foreign shareholder’s claims to domestic capital
income (λθ − (1 − λ)θ). The equilibrium value for λ is the one for which the direct eﬀect and
the indirect eﬀects exactly oﬀset, so that changes in relative investment have no eﬀect on relative
consumption.
Why do portfolios exhibit home bias? If the lion’s share of income goes to labor (θ < 0.5) and,
and if preferences are biased towards domestically-produced goods (ω > 0.5), then the indirect
eﬀect of an increase in relative domestic investment on relative consumption is positive (the second
term in (33) is positive). It is positive because the change in the terms of trade triggered by
an increase in domestic demand favors domestic agents. Because the relative values of domestic
earnings increases, domestic residents can aﬀord to ﬁnance (by holding most of domestic equity)
the bulk of an increase domestic investment while still equalizing consumption across countries.
3.2 Microeconomic intuition
The key to understanding optimal portfolio choice from the perspective of an individual agent is
to understand how the returns to domestic and foreign stocks co-vary with non-diversiﬁable labor
income. If returns to domestic stocks co-vary negatively with labor earnings, then domestic stocks
will oﬀer a good hedge against labor income risk, and agents will prefer a portfolio biased towards
domestic ﬁrms. In Section 2.6 we described an equilibrium in which perfect risk sharing is achieved,
and in which home bias is in fact observed. This suggests that domestic stock returns do in fact
co-vary negatively with labor income. At ﬁrst sight, this might seem a rather puzzling result, given
that the production technology is Cobb-Douglas, suggesting a constant division of output between
factors. We now explain how two key features of the BKK environment, durable capital and relative
price dynamics, interact to give rise to this negative covariance.
First, recall that perfect risk sharing means equalizing the value of consumption across countries,
state by state: c(st) = e(st)c∗(st).
The diﬀerence between the value of domestic and foreign earnings (in units of the domestic ﬁnal
good) is
(34) qa(st)w(st)n(st) − e(st)q∗




16Thus the relative value of domestic earnings rises in response to an increase in z(st) relative to
z∗(st) if and only if the increase in the relative production of good a relative to good b exceeds
the increase in the terms of trade (i.e. the price of good b relative to good a). In our economy
this condition is satisﬁed: thus a positive domestic productivity shock is good news for domestic
workers.
Now to rationalize the ﬁnding that agents prefer to bias their portfolios towards domestic stocks
we need to show that in response to a positive domestic productivity shock, the return to domestic
stocks declines relative to the return to foreign stocks, and thus that domestic stocks oﬀer a good
hedge against non-diversiﬁable labor income risk.










Using the expressions for equilibrium stock prices - P(st) = k(st) and P∗(st) = k∗(st) - along
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The ﬁrst term in this expression captures the change in relative income from capital, and it has
exactly the same ﬂavor as the change in relative earnings: through this term, a positive domestic
productivity shock will increase the relative return on domestic stocks as long as the terms of trade
does not respond too strongly. However, there is also a second term in the expression for relative
returns, as long as depreciation is only partial. This captures the fact that part of the return to
buying a stock is the change in its price. A positive domestic productivity shock drives up the real
exchange rate e(st) and thus drives down the relative value of undepreciated domestic capital (since
ﬁnal consumption and investment are perfectly substitutable in production, the relative price of
capital is equal to the relative price of consumption). Whether relative returns to domestic stocks
17rise or fall in response to a positive productivity shock depends on whether the ﬁrst or second
term dominates. In the model described above, the second term dominates, meaning that when
faced with a positive shock, owners of domestic stocks lose more from the ensuing devaluation of
domestic capital than they gain from a higher rental rate.
We are not the ﬁrst to relate portfolio choice to the pattern of co-movement between labor income
and domestic and foreign stock returns. Cole (1988), Brainard and Tobin (1992), and Baxter and
Jermann (1997) argued that in models driven entirely by productivity shocks, one should expect
labor income to co-move more strongly with domestic rather than foreign stock returns, thereby
indicating strong incentives to aggressively diversify. Bottazzi, Pesenti and van Wincoop (1996)
argued that this prediction could be over-turned by extending models to incorporate additional
sources of risk that redistribute income between capital and labor, and thereby lower the correlation
between returns on human and physical capital. They suggested terms of trade shocks as a possible
candidate. We have shown that in fact it is not necessary to introduce a second source of risk: the
endogenous response of the terms of trade to productivity shocks is all that is required to generate
realistic levels of home bias. The existing empirical evidence on correlations between returns to
labor and domestic versus foreign stocks is, for the most part, qualitatively consistent with the
pattern required to generate home bias. Important papers on this topic are Bottazzi et. al. (1996),
Palacios-Huerta (2001), and Julliard (2002).
3.2.1 Impulse responses
To further our understanding of how perfect risk sharing is achieved with time-invariant and home-
biased portfolios, it is helpful to examine the response of macro variables to a productivity shock
in this economy. In order to do so, we must ﬁrst fully parameterize the model. We discuss our
calibration in detail in the next section, and report parameter values in Table 1. Figure 1 plots
impulse responses to a persistent (but mean reverting) positive productivity shock in the domestic
country. The path for productivity in the two countries is depicted in panel (a). Stock returns, labor
earnings, ﬁnancial wealth and stock prices are all plotted in units of the domestic ﬁnal consumption
good.
In the period of the shock, the relative return to domestic labor increases, and the gap between
relative earnings persists through time (see panel c). The diﬀerential can persist because labor
is immobile internationally. In the period of the shock, realized returns to foreign stocks exceed
returns to domestic stocks, reﬂecting a decline in the relative value of domestic capital (panel b).









































































































































































































































Figure 1: Impulse responses to a domestic productivity shock
19After the ﬁrst period, however, returns to domestic and foreign stocks are equalized. The reason
for this result is simply that stocks are freely traded and thus equilibrium stock prices must adjust
to equalize expected returns, up to a ﬁrst-order approximation.10
Because agents do not adjust their portfolios in response to the shock, the decline in the relative
value of domestic stocks on impact means that ﬁnancial wealth for home-biased domestic agents
declines relative to the wealth of foreigners (panel e). This means that in the periods immediately
following the shock, even though returns are equalized, the total asset income accruing to foreign
agents is larger, because they hold more ﬁnancial wealth in total. This additional asset income
exactly oﬀsets foreigners’ lower labor income, and the relative value of consumption is equalized.
Over time, the domestic productivity shocks decays, while the real exchange rate remains above
its steady state level. As a consequence, foreign labor income eventually rises above domestic labor
income. But notice that now, because of capital accumulation in country 1 (panel f), domestic
wealth now exceeds foreign wealth, and this compensates domestic residents for the fact that they
expect relatively low earnings during the remainder of the transition back to steady state.
To summarize, from the point of view of an individual worker / investor, optimal portfolio choice
can be interpreted in the usual way as depending on the covariances between non-diversiﬁable labor
income and the returns on domestic and foreign stocks. The key feature of this environment, how-
ever, is that these covariances are endogenous and depend critically on the dynamics of investment
and relative prices. An important message from the preceding analysis is that the model makes
clear predictions about the signs of these covariances, and, perhaps surprisingly, returns to domestic
labor and capital tend to co-move negatively, even though the model is frictionless and the only
shocks are Hicks-neutral innovations to TFP.
3.3 Diversiﬁcation and the trade share
When ω = 0.5, so that changes in demand fall equally on domestic and foreign intermediate
goods, relative output and earnings are automatically equated across countries (∆y(st) = 0 in
equation 31). This reﬂects the fact that changes in relative quantities are exactly canceled out by
oﬀsetting changes in the terms of trade, as in Cole and Obstfeld (1991). In this case, perfect risk
sharing implies a constant real exchange rate (e(st) = 1), so that relative stock returns are also















20equated across countries (the second term in equation 37 drops out). Thus, as in Cole and Obstfeld’s
endowment economy, any portfolio automatically delivers perfect insurance against country-speciﬁc
risk, and the equilibrium value for λ is indeterminate.
For ω 6= 0.5, there is a unique equilibrium portfolio deﬁned by equation (24). A lower trade
share (a larger value for ω) implies a lower value for diversiﬁcation, (1 − λ). The intuition is as
follows. For ω > 0.5, reducing the trade share implies that in response to a positive domestic
productivity shock, the associated increase in domestic investment is increasingly targeted towards
domestic intermediate goods. This attenuates the increase in the relative price of the (relatively
scarce) foreign intermediate good, and magniﬁes the increase in relative domestic earnings. Thus,
as the import share is reduced, non-diversiﬁable labor income becomes a more important risk that
agents want to hedge in ﬁnancial markets. This pushes agents towards more asymmetric portfolios,
which continue to favor the asset (domestic stocks) whose return co-moves negatively with earnings.
3.4 Diversiﬁcation and labor’s share
Equation (24) indicates that the larger is labor’s share, the stronger is home bias. This is the
opposite of the Baxter and Jermann (1997) result, who found that introducing labor supply made
observed home bias even more puzzling from a theoretical standpoint. Both results are easy to
rationalize. The larger is labor’s share, the larger is the increase in relative domestic earnings
following a positive productivity shock, and thus the greater is the demand for asset’s whose return
co-varies negatively with domestic output. In our economy, that asset is the foreign stock. In the
Baxter and Jermann one-good world, it is the domestic stock.
Van Wincoop and Warnock (2006) emphasize a diﬀerent force that can also deliver home bias
in two-good models: negative covariance between the real exchange rate and the return diﬀerential
between domestic and foreign stocks. If domestic stocks pay a relatively high return in states of
the world in which domestic goods are expensive (i.e. the real exchange rate is low) then, since
domestic residents mostly consume domestic goods, they may prefer to mostly hold domestic stocks.
Note that this eﬀect is not the driver of home bias in our basic set-up. In fact Van Wincoop and
Warnock (2006) show that this mechanism generates home bias only when the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion exceeds one. By contrast, our model generates substantial home bias even with risk
aversion equal to one.11 The most important diﬀerence between our environment and theirs is that
they abstract from labor income. In the presence of non-diversiﬁable labor income, portfolio choice
11We experiment with alternative values for risk aversion in Section 4.2.
21is driven primarily by the covariance between relative excess stock returns and labor income (rather
than exchange rates). We conclude that abstracting either from imperfect substitutability between
traded goods (as in Baxter and Jermann) or from labor supply (as in van Wincoop and Warnock)
leads to an incomplete account of the theoretical determinants of portfolio choice.
4 Sensitivity Analysis
Three key assumptions are required to deliver our closed-form expression for portfolio choice: ﬁrst,
that the elasticity of substitution between traded intermediate goods is unity (so that the G func-
tions are Cobb-Douglas); second, that utility is logarithmic in consumption; and third, that there
is only one type of shock. We now experiment with relaxing these assumptions. The main ﬁnding
from these experiments is that a strong bias toward domestic assets is a robust feature of this
model: the only case in which home bias disappears is when the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods is very high, in which case portfolios resemble those in the one-good
model.
In order to compute equilibrium country portfolios in a general set-up we must fully specify
the remaining parameters of the model, including a stochastic process for productivity shocks.
Most parameters are straightforward to calibrate, since variations on this model have been widely
studied. Here we mostly follow Heathcote and Perri (2004), who show that a similar model economy
can successfully replicate a set of key international business cycle statistics for the U.S. versus an
aggregate of industrial countries over the period 1986-2001. Table 1 below reports the values.
22Table 1. Parameter values
Preferences
Discount factor β = 0.99
Disutility from labor V (.) = vn1+φ
1+φ
v = 9.7, φ = 1
Technology
Capital’s share θ = 0.34
Depreciation rate δ = 0.025








































We then solve the model numerically, and compute average values for diversiﬁcation in sim-
ulations.12 Solving for equilibria numerically requires a non-standard numerical method, since
standard linearization techniques cannot handle the consumers’ portfolio problem. The numerical
technique we employ is described in detail in Appendix B.
4.1 Elasticity of substitution and risk aversion
The Cobb-Douglas aggregator for producing ﬁnal goods implies a unitary elasticity of substitution
between the traded goods a and b. This elasticity is towards the low end of estimates used in
the business cycle literature. Panel (a) of ﬁgure 2 shows how the average equilibrium level of
diversiﬁcation changes as the elasticity of substitution, σ, is varied from 0.8 to 2.5, given a CES
aggregator of the form G(a,b) = (ωa
σ−1




σ−1. The main message of the picture is
that for commonly-used elasticities, theory predicts strong (even too strong) home bias. Notice also
that increasing substitutability strengthens home bias within this range of values for σ. The logic
for this result is that the more substitutable are a and b, the less relative prices change in response
to shocks. This means that following a positive domestic shock, the increase in the relative value
12Note that, in general, the share of foreign assets in wealth need not to be constant.






























































































Figure 2: International diversiﬁcation and elasticity of substitution
of domestic labor earnings becomes larger and, at the same time, the decline in relative domestic
stock returns becomes smaller. Thus agents must overweight domestic stocks to an even greater
extent in order to hedge such risks.
For very high elasticities (values for σ exceeding 4), price movements become so small that,
following a positive domestic shock, returns to domestic stocks exceed returns to foreign stocks,
and the correlation between relative labor income and relative domestic stock returns turns positive.
For such high elasticities, the two-good model is suﬃciently close to the one-good model that its
portfolio implications are similar. In particular it is optimal for the individual to hedge against
shocks to relative labor income by shorting domestic assets. Thus the average portfolio displays a
very strong - and counter-factual - foreign bias.
Panel (b) of ﬁgure 2 shows how diversiﬁcation changes as we change the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion, γ. Notice that higher risk aversion leads to higher home-bias. Changing the risk
aversion coeﬃcient does not impact the two equilibrium relationships (equations 28 and 31) de-
veloped in Section 3.1. Changing γ does, however, change the pattern of co-movement between
domestic and foreign consumption consistent with perfect risk-sharing. In particular, since higher
risk aversion corresponds to a lower inter-temporal elasticity of substitution for consumption, γ−1,
desired consumption becomes less sensitive to changes in relative prices. Thus in choosing port-
folios, agents want to ensure that their total income does not decline too much in periods when
domestic productivity falls and the relative price of domestic consumption increases (e(st) declines).
24This pushes agents further towards domestic stocks, whose relative return rises in periods when
domestic productivity and earnings decline.
4.2 Preference shocks and the Backus Smith evidence
In equilibria of our benchmark model, the real exchange rate is perfectly correlated with the ratio
between real domestic consumption and real foreign consumption. To see this consider the impact
in the model of an increase in domestic productivity. This raises domestic relative to foreign
consumption (because of eﬃcient risk sharing and home bias in consumption) and at the same time
causes a depreciation of the exchange rate (because the price of the more abundant domestically-
produced good falls). This mechanism is actually consistent with a large body of empirical evidence
which studies the response of international relative prices to productivity shocks.13 As Backus and
Smith (1993) ﬁrst noted, however, for most countries the raw correlation between the real exchange
rate and relative consumption is either close to zero or negative. This failure of the prototypical
international business cycle model is well-known, but it raises the question of whether the model
delivers realistic portfolios only at the cost of counter-factual co-movement between international
relative prices and relative quantities. In this section we argue that this is not the case. In
particular, we modify the basic model to make it consistent with the Backus-Smith evidence, and
then show that the home bias motive remains (in fact it is strengthened).
We begin by noting that when productivity shocks are the only shocks in the model, the high
conditional correlation between relative productivity and the real exchange rate mechanically trans-
lates into a high unconditional correlation between relative consumption and the exchange rate.
This suggests that one way to address the Backus-Smith evidence is to simply introduce an addi-
tional source of risk, so as to decouple conditional from unconditional correlations. In particular,
we experiment with introducing taste shocks, following Stockman and Tesar (1995), as a simple
reduced-form way to model demand-side shocks.
13See, for example, Acemoglu and Ventura (2002), Debaere and Lee (2004), and Pavlova and Rigobon (2007).
These papers use diﬀerent methodologies to identify productivity shocks and ﬁnd support for this mechanism in a
cross section of countries. For the United States the evidence is more mixed: Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2006) ﬁnd
no evidence of this mechanism, while Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006) ﬁnd that in response to US productivity
growth, the US real exchange rate depreciates strongly.













= eζ∗(st) lnc∗(st) − v
n∗(st)1+φ
1 + φ
where the vector of taste shocks [ζ(st) ζ∗(st)] evolves exogenously according to a similar process
to the one we assumed for productivity shocks. In particular, we assume that innovations to taste
shocks are uncorrelated across countries, uncorrelated with innovations to productivity shocks, and
that taste shocks and productivity shocks are equally persistent.
To understand why taste shocks lower the correlation between the real exchange rate and relative
consumption, consider the eﬀect of a positive taste shock in country 1. In response to the shock,
consumers in country 1 will want to increase current consumption and this, because of the home
preference bias in consumption, will raise the world demand for good a. Since productivity in
country 1 (the producer of good a) is unchanged, the price of good a relative to good b will tend to
rise, inducing more labor input in country 1. Thus, in equilibrium, relative consumption and relative
output will increase, while the terms of trade and the real exchange rate will fall, inducing a negative
conditional correlation between relative consumption and the real exchange rate. Since productivity
shocks induce a positive conditional correlation, the equilibrium unconditional correlation between
relative consumption and the real exchange rate will depend on the relative volatility of the two
types of risk.
Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows how the correlation changes as the volatility of taste shocks is
increased from 0 to 1.2 times the volatility of productivity shocks. Notice that when the volatility
of taste shocks is similar to the volatility of productivity shocks, the correlation between the real
exchange rate and relative consumption is close to zero, and thus consistent with the Backus-Smith
evidence.14
Panel (b) of the ﬁgure shows the crucial part of this experiment: how does the equilibrium
average share of foreign assets change as we increase the size of taste shocks? The panel shows that
the larger are taste shocks, the stronger is the bias toward domestic assets. This indicates that do-
14It is also easy to assess how taste shocks aﬀect standard business cycle statistics produced by the model. Broadly
speaking, taste shocks mostly aﬀect statistics related to consumption; in particular, relative to models without taste
shocks, they tend to increase volatility of consumption relative to output, to reduce the correlation between domestic
consumption and domestic output, and to lower the international correlation of consumption relative to the one of
output. Even for volatile taste shocks (volatility 1.5 times that of productivity shocks) the statistics generated by
the model are well within the range of corresponding empirical moments for OECD countries.
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Figure 3: The role of taste shocks
mestic stocks are a good hedge against taste shocks. To understand why, recall that when domestic
demand increases (ζ(st) is high), domestically-produced goods become relatively expensive, and
the real exchange rate appreciates. This change in international relative prices raises the relative
return on domestic stocks, which is good news for domestic high-marginal-utility investors. Thus
the same relative price movement that resolves the Backus-Smith puzzle also makes local stocks
even more attractive to investors.
5 Explaining diversiﬁcation across countries and time
The main analytical result of this paper, summarized in Proposition 1, oﬀers a prediction for the
levels of international diversiﬁcation we should observe across countries, and establishes a link
between international diversiﬁcation and the trade share. In this section, we take these predictions
to the data in order to assess the extent to which our model can shed light on the patterns of
international diversiﬁcation that we see across countries and over time. The ﬁrst issue we need to
confront is that our model focuses on a world with two symmetric countries, while international
diversiﬁcation data are drawn from countries which are heterogenous in many dimensions, including
size, level of development, and the extent of ﬁnancial liberalization. One possible way to deal with
this issue would be to enrich our basic model to include many heterogenous countries and to then
bring such a model to the data; we view that as an interesting project, but one that is beyond the
27scope of this paper.15
Here we address the issue in two ways. First, we restrict our empirical analysis to a relatively
homogenous and ﬁnancially liberalized group of countries: high income economies (as classiﬁed
by the World Bank) over the period 1990-2004. Second, within this group, we assess whether
factors omitted in the model, such as size or level of development, are important empirical factors
in explaining diversiﬁcation patterns.
5.1 Data








which is a linear relationship between the reciprocal of diversiﬁcation, 1/(1−λ), and the reciprocal
of the trade share, 1/(1 − ω). Our measure of international diversiﬁcation in the model, 1 − λ, is
both the ratio of gross foreign assets to wealth and the ratio of gross foreign liabilities to wealth.
Thus to construct empirical measures of diversiﬁcation we need data on gross foreign assets, gross
foreign liabilities, and total country wealth. We obtain data on total gross foreign assets (FA)
and total gross foreign liabilities (FL) from the exhaustive dataset collected by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006). Since ours is a general equilibrium macroeconomic model, it is appropriate to
focus on broad measures of diversiﬁcation. Thus our empirical measures of both FA and FL
include portfolio equity investment, foreign direct investment, debt (including loans or trade credit),
ﬁnancial derivatives and reserve assets (excluding gold). We identify total country wealth as the
value of the entire domestic capital stock plus gross foreign assets less gross foreign liabilities:
K + FA − FL. One important issue regarding the capital stock is whether it should be measured
at book value (i.e. by cumulating investment) or at market value (as reﬂected, for example, in
stock prices). Ideally, one would like to construct a measure of capital that is consistent with the
valuation of foreign assets and foreign liabilities. Unfortunately, values for some asset categories
15We did experiment with one dimension of heterogeneity. In particular we considered an extension of our main
model in which the two countries diﬀer in terms of population. We then solve this version of the model numerically,
given the parameter values described in Table 1, and compare the average equilibrium level of diversiﬁcation to
the level predicted by equation 24. We ﬁnd that, for the smaller economy, the equilibrium level of diversiﬁcation
exceeds that which would be observed in the corresponding symmetric-size economy, while for the larger economy,
the equilibrium level of diversiﬁcation is below that which would be prediction by (24), given the country’s import
share. However, these diﬀerences are generally small (less than 1%), unless the smaller country is both very open
and very small.
28(such as foreign direct investment) are constructed using book values, while others (such as portfolio
equity investment) are constructed using market values. In light of this issue we construct two series
for the capital stock. In our baseline approach, we start from the initial capital stock ﬁgures in
Dhareshwar and Nehru (1993), and then construct time series by cumulating investments from the
Penn World Tables 6.2 (as, for example, in Kraay et. al. 2006). We label this measure KB. We then
compute an alternative measure of the capital stock, KM, which uses information on stock market
growth to revalue the publicly-traded component of the capital stock.16 We measure international
diversiﬁcation for country i in period t as
(1 − λ)it =
FAit + FLit
2(Kit + FAit − FLit)
.
We measure the trade share for country i in period t, using national income data from the Penn
World Tables 6.2, as




The ﬁnal piece of evidence we need is capital’s share of income, θ. Consistently with evidence
reported in Gollin (2002) we will assume θ to be constant over time and across countries at a value
of 0.34.
5.2 Diversiﬁcation across countries
In this section we abstract from time variation in diversiﬁcation, and focus on explaining average
diversiﬁcation across countries. Figure 4 summarizes our main ﬁndings. The circles in the ﬁgure
represent the time averages (over the period 1990-2004) for the reciprocal of diversiﬁcation 1/(1 −
λ)it (computed using KB) and the reciprocal of the trade share 1/(1 − ω)it for each country in
the group of high income economies for which we have data. Note that there is a great deal
of heterogeneity in both the trade share and the diversiﬁcation share, with both shares ranging
from around 10% to over 100%. The solid line shows the relationship between these two variables
obtained estimating equation (39) using OLS. The shaded area represents the 95% conﬁdence
band (using heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors) around the OLS prediction, while the
dashed line is the relationship between trade and diversiﬁcation implied by the model, assuming
θ = 0.34. The ﬁgure suggests that the trade share is an important factor in explaining the variation
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Figure 4: Diversiﬁcation and trade shares: data and model
in international diversiﬁcation across countries.17 The quantitative predictions from our theory
regarding both the level of diversiﬁcation and the relation between diversiﬁcation and trade lie
within two standard deviations of the data estimates.
In Table 2 we report the results of the regression depicted in the picture (column 1), along with
various other robustness checks. In all of these regressions the dependent variable is the reciprocal
of average diversiﬁcation over the period. Regressions 1, 3 and 5 include only a constant and the
reciprocal of the trade share as independent variables, while regressions 2, 4 and 6 also include,
as controls, the log of average GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) and the log of average population.
Regressions 1 through 4 use diversiﬁcation measures computed our benchmark measure of the
capital stock (constructed cumulating investment), while regressions 5 and 6 use the capital stock
measure that incorporates stock market information. Finally, regressions 3 and 4 (LAD) compute
17Portes and Rey (2003) and Collard et al. (2007) also highlight a strong empirical relation between trade in assets
and trade in goods.
30the coeﬃcients by minimizing absolute deviations. These results are less sensitive to outliers.
The ﬁrst row reports the coeﬃcient on the reciprocal of the trade share, as estimated in the
data (the ﬁrst six columns) and as predicted by the model (the last column). Notice that in all
cases the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (at the 1% level) conﬁrming the strong link
between trade and ﬁnancial diversiﬁcation. Quantitatively the coeﬃcients estimated empirically
are not far from the one predicted by the model: in all speciﬁcations except (5) one cannot reject
at the 5% signiﬁcance level the hypothesis that the coeﬃcient estimated in the data is equal to
the one predicted by the model. The second and third rows assess the eﬀect of GDP per capita
and size on international diversiﬁcation. Our symmetric model is silent about the eﬀects of those
variables; nevertheless it is interesting to assess i) whether these variables are indeed statistically
correlated with diversiﬁcation, and ii) whether the relation between trade and diversiﬁcation is
aﬀected by the inclusion of these variables. In particular, since it is well known that small countries
and rich countries tend to trade more, one might wonder whether trade matters for diversiﬁcation
only to the extent that trade proxies for size or GDP per capita. The numbers in the table do not
support this conjecture. Rather, columns 2, 4 and 6 indicate that size and GDP per capita are not
statistically related to diversiﬁcation, as long as the openness variable is retained.18 Furthermore,
the statistical and economic signiﬁcance of the relationship between diversiﬁcation and trade is
largely unaﬀected by whether or not these additional controls are included.
The row labeled “Predicted median diversiﬁcation” in Table 2 reports the predicted diversiﬁca-
tion for a hypothetical country with the median value of the independent variables, based on the
regressions and on the relationship implied by the model. The numbers in this row indicate that the
prediction of the theory for this median economy is statistically close to the level of diversiﬁcation
observed in the data (for speciﬁcation 1 this result could have been anticipated simply by looking
at Figure 4 and noticing that the model line lies within the shaded area). Finally, the R2 ﬁgures
in the last row suggest that diﬀerences in openness to trade can alone explain between 30 and 40
percent of cross-country variation in portfolio diversiﬁcation.
We conclude that the predictions of the model regarding the level of diversiﬁcation and the
relationship between diversiﬁcation and trade are qualitatively and quantitatively helpful for un-
derstanding the cross-section of country portfolios in developed economies. Of course, a signiﬁcant
18This result crucially hinges on the fact that we have selected a group of fairly homogenous countries. We have
also repeated the analysis for a larger group of countries including developing economies and found that, although
the strong link between trade and diversiﬁcation remains, income per capita becomes an important determinant of
diversiﬁcation, with richer countries being more diversiﬁed.
31Table 2. Cross-sectional regressions
Dependent variable is reciprocal of diversiﬁcation, 1/(1 − λ)i
OLS, KB LAD, KB OLS, KM
Model
θ = 0.34









































Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29
R2 0.38 0.44 0.30 0.33 0.39 0.43
Note: numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-corrected (for the OLS speciﬁcations) standard errors. Bold statistics
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. A † superscript on a data statistic indicates that the corresponding
model statistic lies within the two standard deviation band around the data
fraction of heterogeneity in diversiﬁcation is not explained by our model, reﬂecting the reality that
countries diﬀer in multiple dimensions in addition to openness. For example, the fact that United
Kingdom and Luxembourg are excessively diversiﬁed from the standpoint of the theory (see Figure
4) is probably related to those countries’ special positions as international ﬁnancial centers.
5.3 Diversiﬁcation over time
In this section we explore the panel dimension of our dataset to assess whether our framework can
also be used to understand the evolution of international diversiﬁcation in recent years. Strictly
speaking, diversiﬁcation does not change over time in equilibria of our baseline model. However,
suppose that between period t and period t+k country i experienced an unexpected and permanent
change in ω, the parameter which determines the trade share. Then equation (39) would hold in



























Thus changes over time in the reciprocal of diversiﬁcation for a country should be linearly related
to changes over time in the reciprocal of its trade share. In order to focus on changes in the trade
32share in the data that are (possibly) persistent and unanticipated, we examine changes over ﬁve year
intervals.19 In Table 3 we explore whether equation (40) can shed light on changes in diversiﬁcation
over time in our sample of countries. Regressions 1 through 3 use diversiﬁcation constructed using
our benchmark capital measure KB, while regressions 4 through 6 use our alternative capital
measure, KM. In columns 1 and 4 we estimate equation (40) directly, including a constant in the
regressions. The results show that time diﬀerences in the reciprocal of openness are indeed linearly
related to time diﬀerences in the reciprocal of diversiﬁcation. The estimated regression coeﬃcients
are not statistically diﬀerent from the one predicted by the model.
Table 3. Changes regression
Dependent variable is change in the reciprocal of diversiﬁcation
OLS, KB OLS, KM
Model
θ = 0.34









































Country & period dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 279 279 279 279 279 279
R2 0.20 0.24 0.77 0.12 0.18 0.72
Note: numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. Bold statistics are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 at the 1% level. A data statistic with † indicates that the corresponding model statistic lies within the two
standard deviation band around the data
Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 add controls to the basic regressions. We ﬁnd it interesting that even
after including growth in GDP per capita and population and (in speciﬁcations 3 and 6) country
and period dummies - and thus allowing for a variety of factors to aﬀect changes in diversiﬁcation
- the link between trade and diversiﬁcation remains strongly signiﬁcant and quantitatively similar
to the link predicted by the model. Finally the row labeled “Predicted median divers. change”
reports the change in diversiﬁcation (as predicted by the data and by the model) for a hypothetical
19Speciﬁcally, our data points include changes of the relevant variables over all possible ﬁve year intervals within
the period 1990-2004, for all 29 countries for which we have data. This gives a total of 279 observations. We have
also conducted the analysis focusing on changes over three and seven year intervals, and found that results are not
signiﬁcantly aﬀected. These results are available on the authors’ web pages.
33country whose initial diversiﬁcation and whose changes in trade openness and other independent
variables are equal to their respective median values in the sample.20 Note that the data (columns
1, 2, 4 and 5) predict a sizeable increase in diversiﬁcation (around 15%) for this median country,
while the model, in which increased diversiﬁcation stems only from increased trade, predicts a much
smaller increase (around 2%).
To summarize, the data suggest that growth in trade is linked to growth in diversiﬁcation, and
this link is qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the link predicted by our model. At the
same time, in the context of our model, the observed growth in trade over the period 1990-2004 can
only explain slightly more than ten percent of the increase in international diversiﬁcation we have
observed over the same period. Investigating the causes of the unexplained growth in diversiﬁcation
is an interesting direction for future research.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that standard macroeconomic theory predicts patterns for international
portfolio diversiﬁcation that are broadly consistent with those observed empirically in recent years.
The economic model we used to generate theoretical predictions for portfolio choice was a standard
two-country two-good version of the stochastic growth model that has been widely used in business
cycle research. We conclude that, from the perspective of standard macroeconomic theory, the
observed bias towards domestic assets is not a puzzle. We have explored the economics underlying
this result, and argued that the dynamics of investment and international relative price movements,
elements which have been largely overlooked in the existing literature on portfolio choice, are central
to understanding portfolio choice.
Important questions remain. In our analysis we have focussed primarily on the predictions of our
model for portfolio diversiﬁcation. However, it is well known that it is diﬃcult to reconcile many
features of asset prices with the predictions of stochastic general equilibrium production economies.
For example, relative to the predictions of our model, actual stock prices and real exchange rates
appear excessively volatile. A general equilibrium theoretical resolution of these pricing puzzles is
required to bridge the gap between the macroeconomic theory and empirical ﬁnance literatures on
portfolio choice. A somewhat less ambitious task for future work is to build a multi-country version
20Speciﬁcally, the median value for initial diversiﬁcation (across countries and ﬁve year periods) is 29% (for both
deﬁnitions of capital), the median (annualized) change in trade share is 0.33%, and the median (annualized) growth
in GDP per capita and population are 3.7% and 0.5% respectively.
34of the model which allows for multi-lateral trade in goods, and multi-lateral diversiﬁcation in assets.
Such a model would lead to a better understanding of the separate roles of size and openness in
understanding portfolio diversiﬁcation. It would also generate richer predictions linking trading
patterns to distributions of foreign assets and liabilities by country.
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38Appendix A. Proof of proposition 1





The equations that characterize a solution to the planner’s problem are:















2. First order conditions for allocating intermediate goods across countries:
Uc(st)ωG(st)/a(st) = U∗
c (st)(1 − ω)G∗(st)/a∗(st)
Uc(st)(1 − ω)G(st)/b(st) = U∗
c (st)ωG∗(st)/b∗(st)




















































4. Resource constraints of the form (21) and (22).
Consider the set of allocations that satisﬁes this set of equations, i.e. the solution to the planner’s
problem. We now show there exists a set of prices at which these same allocations also satisfy the set
of equations deﬁning equilibrium in the stock trade economy (see Section 2.5), given the portfolios
described in equation (24). In other words, we can decentralize the complete markets allocations
with asset trade limited to two stocks and constant portfolios.
Let intermediate-goods prices be given by equations (20). Then condition (1) for the stock trade
economy is satisﬁed. Let wages be given by equations (15) and (16). Then condition (2) for the
stock trade economy is satisﬁed. Substituting these prices into condition (1) from the planner’s
problem gives condition (3) for the stock trade economy. Let the real exchange rate by given by
39equation (5). Then combining conditions (2) and (3) from the planner’s problem gives condition
(4) for the stock trade economy. Condition (4) from the planner’s problem translates directly into
conditions (5) and (6) for the stock trade economy. Condition (7) - stock market clearing - follows
immediately from the symmetry of the candidate stock purchase rules.
Condition (8) is that households’ budget constraints are satisﬁed. Given constant portfolios,
the domestic household’s budget constraint simpliﬁes to
c(st) = qa(st)w(st)n(st) + λd(st) + (1 − λ)e(st)d∗(st)
Substituting in the candidate function for w(st), the resource constraint for intermediate goods,
and the deﬁnitions for dividends (and suppressing the state-contingent notation) gives
c = qa(1 − θ)(a + a∗) + λ(qaθ(a + a∗) − x) + (1 − λ)e(q∗
bθ(b + b∗) − x∗)
Using the candidate expression for the real exchange rate gives
c = (1 − θ + λθ)(qaa + eq∗
aa∗) − λx + (1 − λ)θ(qbb + eq∗
bb∗) − (1 − λ)ex∗
Now using the candidate expressions for intermediate goods prices and collecting terms gives
c = [ω + (1 − λ)(θ − 2ωθ)]G + e[(1 − ω) − (1 − λ)(θ − 2ωθ)]G∗ − λx − (1 − λ)ex∗
Using the resource constraint for ﬁnal goods ﬁrms gives
G = [ω + (1 − λ)(θ − 2ωθ)]G + e[(1 − ω) − (1 − λ)(θ − 2ωθ)]G∗
+(1 − λ)(G − c) − (1 − λ)e(G∗ − c∗)
Given the candidate expression for the real exchange rate, and exploiting the assumption that
utility is logarithmic in consumption, condition (2) for the planners problem implies
c = ec∗.
Thus the budget constraint can be rewritten as
G = [ω + (1 − λ)(1 + θ − 2ωθ)]G + e[(1 − ω) − (1 − λ)(1 + θ − 2ωθ)]G∗
Finally substituting in the candidate expression for λ conﬁrms that the domestic consumer’s budget
constraint is satisﬁed. The foreign consumer’s budget constraint is satisﬁed by Walras’ Law.
Condition (9) is the households’ inter-temporal ﬁrst order conditions for stock purchases. Sub-
stituting condition (2) from the planner’s problem into condition (3), the planner’s ﬁrst order
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Let stock prices by given by
(41) P(st) = k(st), P∗(st) = k∗(st) ∀t,st.
Substituting these candidate prices for stocks, the prices for intermediate goods, the wage, and the
expressions for dividends into the planner’s ﬁrst order conditions for investment gives the domestic
household’s ﬁrst order condition for domestic stock purchases, and the foreign household’s ﬁrst
order condition for foreign stock purchases. The remaining two ﬁrst-order conditions for stock
purchases follow immediately by substituting condition (2) from the planner’s problem into these
two conditions.
Appendix B. Computational algorithm
Here we describe the algorithm that allows us to solve for equilibrium portfolio holdings in the
generalized version of the model described in Section 4. By generalized, we mean parameterizations
for which Proposition 1 does not apply, and for which portfolios must be characterized numerically.
Our algorithm can be used to solve for equilibria in more general international macro models with
portfolio choice, and thus it complements the recent work of Devereux and Sutherland (2006), Tille
and van Wincoop (2007), and Evans and Hnatkovska (2007). Matlab programs that implement
this algorithm are available on the authors websites. We now outline the steps of the algorithm
Step 1. Pick a non-stochastic symmetric steady state equilibrium (i.e. an equilibrium in which
agents know that productivities z(st),z∗(st) are constant and equal to 0). We denote such a steady
state with the vector [λH,λ∗
F,X,Y ], where λH,λ∗
F ∈ R are the fractions of local stocks held by
home and foreign residents, respectively, X ∈ Rn is the vector of non portfolio state variables (i.e.
productivities and capital stock.).while Y ∈ Rm is the vector of non portfolio control variables (i.e.
consumption, investment, terms of trade etc.). Notice that ﬁrst order conditions plus symmetry
uniquely pin down X and Y , while any value λ0 = λH = λ∗
F is a non-stochastic symmetric steady
state equilibrium.
Step 2. Compute decision rules λH,t+1 = g1(λH,t,λ∗
F,t,Xt), λH∗,t+1 = g2(λH,t,λ∗
F,t,Xt), Xt+1 =
g3(λH,t,λ∗
F,t,Xt,εt+1), Yt = g4(λH,t,λ∗
F,t,Xt) that characterize the solution to a second-order ap-
proximation of the stochastic economy around the steady state. The functions g1,g2 ,g3, and g4
are quadratic forms in their arguments and can be computed using the methods described by
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) or Gomme and Klein (2006) among others. Note that in order to
apply those method here it is necessary to slightly modify the model by adding a small adjustment
cost for changing the portfolio from its steady state value. This step yields decision rules for all
variables (including portfolio decisions) that are correct up to a second-order approximation, in
a neighborhood of the steady state around which the economy is linearized. However, we do not
yet know whether the steady state portfolio λ0 we started with is equal to the average equilibrium
41portfolio in the true stochastic economy.
Step 3: Starting from our guess for the steady state, simulate the model for a large number
of periods using the decision rules from Step 2, and compute the average share of wealth held by
domestic agents along the simulation. If this average share is diﬀerent from the initial steady state
share, we set the new guess for the steady state portfolio, λ1, equal to the average simulated share
and return to Step 1. If the simulated average is equal (up to a small tolerance error) to the initial
steady state λ0, then λ0 constitutes a good approximation of the long run portfolio holdings and
we take it as the solution to our portfolio problem.
As a test, we apply this method to our benchmark parameterization and to the one-good model
of Baxter and Jermann (for both these cases we know the true portfolio solution). In both cases our
algorithm converges very rapidly to the true solution, regardless of the initial guess. We also ﬁnd
that the portfolio adjustment costs can be set to an arbitrarily small (but positive) number, such
that changing the size of these costs locally (e.g. doubling their size) does not aﬀect the solution.
Appendix C. Data
The countries we use in our analysis in Section 6 are the high income economies (as classiﬁed by
the World Bank) for which have foreign asset position and capital stock data. This group includes
the following 29 countries (the codes used in Figure 5 are in parentheses) Australia (AUS), Austria
(AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Cyprus (CYP), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France
(FRA), Germany (GER), Greece (GRC), Iceland (ISL), Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA),
Japan (JPN), Korea (KOR), Kuwait (KWT), Luxembourg (LUX), Malta (MLT), Netherlands
(NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Portugal (PRT), Singapore (SGP), Spain (ESP),
Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), United Kingdom (GBR), United States (USA). The data on
gross international diversiﬁcation positions (total foreign assets and foreign liabilities) are in US
dollars and are from Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2006).
We denote by KB,i,t our baseline measure (in US Dollars) for the capital stock in country i in
period t. We construct KB,i,t by multiplying GDP in US dollars (as reported by Lane and Milesi
Ferretti, 2006) by the capital-output ratio. The capital-output ratio is computed as follows: in
1989 we take it directly from Dhareshwar and Nehru (1993), who report both physical capital stock
































is the growth rate of GDP for country i (PPP adjusted, in constant prices (chain






is the ratio between investment and GDP
(both PPP adjusted, in current prices, from PWT 6.2), δ is the depreciation rate which, in the
absence of better information, we set equal to 6% (this value is also used by Kraay et al. 2005) for
all countries and for all years.
Given KB,i,t, we can derive a panel for our alternative measure of capital, KM,i,t The idea
behind this alternative measure is that part of the capital stock of a country is comprised of assets
of ﬁrms quoted on the stock market, and thus we can measure the growth of the value of this
capital simply by measuring the growth of stock prices. For the remaining (non-publicly-traded)
42portion of the capital stock we simply assume the same growth rate as for our baseline measure
KB,i,t More speciﬁcally, we assume that in 1989 KM,i,t = KB,i,t, while for the subsequent years we
use the following recursion:
KM,i,t+1 = (KM,i,t − Si,t)g(KB,i,t) + Si,tg(Pi,t)
where Si,t is the value of the stock market in country i at year t (from Beck et. al., 2000), g(KB,i,t)
is the growth rate of the baseline capital stock in country i, and g(Pi,t) is the growth rate for stock
prices in country i (computed using the growth rate of the Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI) index for country i). For ﬁve countries in our sample (Cyprus, Iceland, Kuwait, Malta and
Luxembourg) we do not have the MSCI country index, and so we simply replace g(Pi,t) with the
growth rate of the total stock market value, g(Si,t). The complete dataset is available online on the
authors websites.
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